The Liberalized Law of Standing
Kenneth Gulp Davist

Four Supreme Court cases, two in 1968 and two in 1970, have drastically
liberalized the federal law of standing, giving it a new basic orientation.'
Yet satisfactory new criteria have not emerged, and the law of the subject is currently in turmoil. The Supreme Court has attempted to lay
down guidelines, but its attempt has been largely unsuccessful.
The purpose of this essay is not only to summarize the new law but
especially to analyze the criteria the Court has tried to formulate, and
to advocate a simpler approach that may be more satisfactory. The law
of standing, which the Supreme Court has called a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction," 2 has long been too complex; and the
recent developments have increased the complexity instead of reducing
it. One good way to achieve simplicity is marked out by Justices Brennan and White in a 1970 opinion in which they assert that "injury in
fact" should be the sole test for standing.3 Although two Justices cannot
by themselves make law, they speak in this instance with special authority because the majority seems likely to retreat from what it has
tried to create.
I. THE FouR KEY CASES

The new law in perspective. Because the four Supreme Court decisions reject the old approach and move toward a new approach to the
law of standing, they may be more important in answering current
questions about standing than all previous decisions. Despite the
present temporary confusion, the direction of movement is entirely
clear: Many plaintiffs who did not have standing under pre-1968 law
now have standing. Probably some plaintiffs who suffer "injury in fact"
from illegal governmental action, still lack standing, but that is far
from clear. Possibly the four cases have moved the law three-quarters
t -John P. Wilson Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 US. 1 (1968); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 90 S.Ct. 827 (1970); Barlow v. Collins,
90 S.Ct. 832 (1970).
2

United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).

3 90 S. Ct. at 841 (concurring and dissenting opinion for Data Processingand Barlow).
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of the distance from the pre-1968 law to the position that "injury in
fact" is the sole test. Justices Brennan and White have firmly reached
that destination. The other six stop short of it, but their stopping point
seems untenable and will apparently have to be moved in one direction
or the other. That the lower courts have increasingly adopted "injury
in fact" as the test is also significant,4 although some courts are either
unaware of the new law or are resisting it.5
The Hardin case.6 The significance of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities
Co. may lie more in what the Supreme Court read into it later than
in what the opinion said. A private utility sought to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority from supplying power to towns served primarily
by the plaintiff, in contravention of a 1959 statute forbidding TVA to
sell power outside "the area for which [it was] the primary source of
power" in 1957. 7 The Court distinguished cases holding that economic
injury from competition is not a basis for standing by saying that those
cases involved injury "from lawful competition" and by saying that
"when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor
has standing to require compliance with that provision." The Court
went on to find that the 1959 statute was designed "to protect private
utilities from TVA competition" and that accordingly the plaintiff had
standing. The Court was unanimous on the question of standing, and
the opinion made that question appear to be easy.
The central proposition of Hardin that parties whose interests are
protected by statute have standing to ask the court to carry out the
congressional will is almost too obvious to state. Of course such parties
have standing. And that is all that the Court held. The significance of
the case does not lie in its holding. It lies in (1) the negative proposition that has later been read into the opinion that parties do not have
standing unless they have interests protected by a statute-a proposition the Court did not state-and (2) the language partially discrediting
a leading case 9 that had become the foundation for much law that a
competitive interest alone cannot be enough for standing. The Court
said in a footnote: "The Court in [Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.]
McKay ruled that an explicit statutory provision was necessary to
4 Outstanding are Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and
Scanwell Laboratories v. Thomas, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
5 E.g., Rasmussen v. United States, 421 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1970).
6 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
7 390 U.S. at 3.
8 Id. at 6.
9 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 884 (1955).
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confer standing because of the 'long established rule' that an injured
competitor cannot sue to enforce statutory requirements not designed
to protect competitors. In the case of statutes concerned with protecting
competitive interests, the 'long established rule' is of course precisely
the opposite."'10 That was a big blow to the structure of case law the
lower courts had built on the foundation of McKay, for judicial opinions had cited it about eighty times; without the McKay support, a
large portion of that structure had to fall, and something else had to
be erected in its place.
The Flast case." This second case in the series, holding that a federal
taxpayer in some circumstances has standing to challenge the validity
of a federal expenditure, has been fully discussed elsewhere by the
present writer. 12 The opinion greatly contributed to the liberalization
of the law of standing, although the specific issue was a highly specialized one.
The Data Processing case.'3 This case and the Barlow case were
decided the same day, Mr. Justice Douglas writing both majority opinions. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote for both cases a single opinion concurring and dissenting, joined by Mr. Justice White. The Barlow
opinion throws light on the meaning of the DataProcessingopinion.
The question in Data Processingwas whether sellers of data processing services had standing to challenge a ruling of the Comptroller of
the Currency allowing national banks to provide such services. That
both the district court and the court of appeals had denied standing
tends to show what the law had become. The district court had said,
quite accurately: "There is a long and well established line of judicial
authority holding that plaintiffs whose only injury is loss due to competition lack standing to maintain legal action to redress their economic
injury."' 4 It cited nine cases, including three Supreme Court cases. The
Eighth Circuit had said that "the courts uniformly have denied standing
to competitors who otherwise possess no legal right to be free from
competition,"'15 and it had quoted from Tennessee Electric Power Co.
v. TVA that one is without standing unless "the right invaded is a legal
right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege."' 6 The Eighth Circuit then had generalized: "Unless a rele10 390 U.S. at 7 n.7.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
12 Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cmi. L. REv. 601 (1968).
13 Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 90 S. Ct. 827 (1970).
14 279 F. Supp. 675, 678 (D. Minn. 1968).
15 406 F.2d at 839.
16 306 U.S. 118, 137-8 (1939).
ii
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vant statute provides for a 'party in interest' to seek judicial review or
unless a complainant possesses a recognized legal interest, he lacks stand7
ing to be a 'private attorney general' to represent the public interest."'
The view of the lower courts was well supported, although the case
law was not free from confusion. The Tennessee Electric remark had
often been used to deny standing to competitors in circumstances like
those of the Data Processingcase, even though the present writer had
8
branded the remark a "palpably false proposition."'.
In reversing, the Supreme Court quoted the Tennessee Electric remark and specifically rejected it, saying only: "The 'legal interest' test
goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns,
apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the question whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."' 9 The Court emphasized in a
footnote that "the existence or non-existence of a 'legal interest' is a
2
matter quite distinct from the problem of standing." 0
A huge portion of the former foundation of the law of standing was
thus knocked out. The old test of "a recognized legal interest" was
specifically rejected. In its place were two new tests. The first, based on
Article III, was "injury in fact, economic or otherwise." The Court
found this test satisfied by the injury from new competition. The second
test-and this is the essence of what the Court tried to create-was
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
The Court gave meaning to the second test by applying it in Data
Processing and in Barlow. The application in the first opinion was
reasonably satisfactory, but the application in Barlow involved an unfortunate inadvertence or misunderstanding, as we shall see. In Data
Processing,section 4 of the statute provided: "No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank
services for banks." 21 Section 4 on its face does not say that Congress
intended to protect nonbank data processors from bank competition.
17

406 F.2d at 843.

18 K.C. DAVIs, ADMINMRATIVE LAW TRFATs E 217 (1958). If the words are taken literally,

no one could challenge a statute outlawing the Baptist Church, or prohibiting Republican
speeches, or denying criminal defendants a jury trial, or authorizing unlawful searches,
or compelling witnesses to testify against themselves. If the words are not taken literally,
what do they mean?
19 90 S. Ct. at 830.
20 90 S. Ct. at 829 n.l.

21 Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964).
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But the First Circuit had made a statement which the Supreme Court
quoted in full, and which must here be quoted almost in full:
Section 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the
service corporations. It was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such a prohibition,
the bill would have enabled "banks to engage in a nonbanking activity," S.Rep. No. 2105 . . . and thus constitute "a
serious exception to the accepted public policy which strictly
limits banks to banking." . . . We think Congress has provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing even though the
competition may not be the precise kind Congress legislated
22
against.
After quoting that passage, the Supreme Court said, and it said no
more on the question of standing: "We do not put the issue in those
words, for they implicate the merits. We do think, however, that § 4
arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected
by it."23
The Barlow case.24 The Supreme Court held in Barlow that tenant
farmers had standing to challenge a regulation which increased their
freedom from governmental restraint-which released the tenant
farmers from restrictions imposed by a prior regulation. The statute
provided for payments to the farmers but permitted them to assign
payments only "as security for cash or advances to finance making a
crop." 25 The prior regulation had defined "making a crop" to exclude
assignments to secure rent for a farm. The challenged regulation defined "making a crop" to include such assignments. The challenged
regulation thus permitted the tenant farmers to do something the prior
regulation prohibited. They objected to the new regulation because it
allegedly allowed landlords to compel them to obtain financing of all
their farni needs from the landlords, who charged such high interest
that their profits each year were consumed in debt payments.
The district court, applying traditional law, denied standing on the
ground that no legally protected interest of the tenant farmers was
invaded. 26 A divided Fifth Circuit affirmed on that ground; it neatly
expressed the traditional law, quoting an earlier opinion: "Thus, in
the absence of an express or implied statutory grant of standing, mere
economic harm to an appellant 'made possible by government action
22 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1152-3 (st Cir. 1969).
23 90 S. Ct. at 831.
24 Barlow v. Collins, 90 St. Ct. 832 (1970).

25 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g) (1964).
26 Unreported.
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(even if allegedly illegal) does not give standing to sue to restrain such
action.' ",27 The court came to grips with the specific question when
it said of landlords' encroachment on tenants' economic bargaining
power: "This is nothing more than an economic consequence permitted, but not required, by government action." 28 Judge Tuttle in
dissent asserted that the statute conferred a "right" on the tenants to
make assignments for making a crop "and restricting their right to
29
assign for any other purpose."
The district court, the majority of the courts of appeals, and the
dissenter all addressed themselves to the issue presented-whether the
particular interest the tenant farmers were asserting was sufficient for
standing.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court wrote an opinion which never
reached that issue. Instead, the Supreme Court reversed on two grounds:
"First,... the tenant farmers... have the personal stake and interest
that impart the concrete adverseness required by Article III. Second,
the tenant farmers are clearly within the zone of interests protected by
the Act."3 0
The Court's second ground needs special attention. What was it
that had to be within the zone of protected interests-(a) the tenant
farmers, (b) their interests in general, or (c) the particular interest they
were asserting? Obviously, the answer should be the particular interest.
The Court went wrong in saying "the tenant farmers are clearly within
the zone .... ." That formulation, however, was a mere verbal infelicity
of no consequence. But the Court's exclusive focus on the "interests of
the tenant farmers," along with its complete failure even to consider
the particularinterest the farmers were asserting, goes to the essence of
the Court's analysis and holding. The Court wrote a paragraph to show
that Congress meant to protect "the interests of tenant farmers," quoting statutory language that the Secretary "shall provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants" and "shall, as far as practicable, protect interests of tenants."31 But those two quotations govern
payments of money, not assignments. The opinion had only one sentence about assignments: "The legislative history of the 'making a crop'
provision, even though sparse, similarly indicates a congressional intent
to benefit the tenants," and the Court supported that sentence with a
footnote about "congressional concern for the farmers' welfare."3 2
27 398 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1968).
28 Id. at 402.
29 Id. at 403.
30 90 S. Ct. at 836.
81 Id.

82 Id. n.7.
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The outstanding fact about the Barlow opinion is that the Court
did not mention and did not directly or indirectly consider the question
whether the particularinterest the tenant farmers were assertingshould
be a basis for standing, or whether that interest was within the zone of
interests "to be protected" by the statute.
Even though the Court clearly indicated that standing does not
depend upon the interest the plaintiff asserts but depends upon "congressional concern" for his "welfare," could the Court possibly have
meant that? If it did, the pride of Farmer Smith in trying to keep up
with the Joneses gives Smith standing to challenge an overpayment by
the government to the Joneses. Not only that, but Congress somewhere
has probably expressed its "concern" for the "welfare" of human beings,
and therefore every human being satisfies the test. Interpreted as the
Court interpreted it in Barlow, the test becomes nonsensical.
The conclusion seems compelled that the Court could not have meant
that the farmers' interests in general are the basis for their standing, as
distinguished from the particular interest the farmers were asserting.
The failure of the Court to examine the particular interest must have
beeii in the-nature of an inadvertence. Despite the Court's analysis and
action in Barlow, the Court probably did not intend to change its
formulation in the Data Processing opinion that the test is "whether
the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone .... 3
If the Court had not fallen into its inadvertence-if it had addressed
itself to the question whether the particular interest asserted was arguably within the zone of interests to be protected-what would it have
held? One can only speculate: Probably no congressional intent can be
found that the interest of the farmers in continuing the restriction on
their legal capacity to make assignments either was "to be protected"
or was not "to be protected." Applying the Court's test as stated in
Data Processing would probably have meant a denial of standing. If
so, would not the Court probably have discerned the inadequacy of the
test it was trying to create, and might it not then have backed away
from that test?
In the remainder of this essay, we shall assume that the Court's failure
to reach the question whether the farmers' particular interest was
enough was only an inadvertence, and that the Court meant to establish
two tests for standing-"injury in fact" and whether the particular
interest asserted is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
3 90 S. Ct. at 830. (Emphasis added.)
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II. Tim LrvE IssuE-THE BRENNAN-WHITE PosmION

In Data Processing and Barlow, the Supreme Court unanimously
superseded a large batch of law that was built on such doctrine as that
of the McKay case3 4 that something in the nature of a "legal right" or
"legal interest" was necessary for standing. That shift is a great accomplishment and it deserves strong emphasis, for federal law of standing now has a new and better orientation. But that much is no longer
a live issue, for it has been fully resolved by a unanimous Court.
The live issue now is not whether the Court should have vastly
broadened the class of those who have standing; the live issue is whether
still further broadening is needed. Justices Brennan and White in a
"concurring and dissenting opinion" asserted that it is.35 The Brennan
opinion adopted the view that "injury in fact" should be the sole test
and that an additional test was "wholly unnecessary and inappropriate"
and "a useless and unnecessary exercise ...which may well deny justice
in this complex field."3 6 The main reliance of the Brennan opinion was
on the Flast case: "In the light of Flast, standing exists when the plaintiff alleges, as the plaintiffs in each of these cases alleged, that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."3 7
The question whether "injury in fact" should be the sole test for
standing is an open question not merely because Justice Brennan and
White assert that it should be, but also because the unsatisfactory opinion of the majority in Barlow cannot close that question, and, in addition, because no holding of the Supreme Court has yet resolved the
question. Since it began its liberalization of the law of standing in
1968, the Supreme Court has not denied standing to any party.
More precisely, the live issue that is worth discussing is this: Assuming that the Court in due course will correct the inadvertence that mars
the Barlow opinion, so that standing will not depend upon "the
interests" of the plaintiff but upon the particular interest asserted,
should standing be denied to one who shows "injury in fact" but who
cannot show that the interest he is asserting is "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"?
The reasons for rejecting the requirement that the asserted interest
be "arguably within the zone" are very powerful. As will now be
argued, that requirement is (1) analytically faulty, (2) contrary to much
34 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, $50
U.S. 884 (1955).
35 90 S. Ct. at 838.
36 Id. at 84).
37 Id. at 841.
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case law the Court should not have intended to overrule, (3) cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial, and (4) at variance with the dominant
intent behind the Administrative Procedure Act.
III. CRrrIcIsm OF THE NE w LAW

(1) The test is analyticallyfaulty. The test requiring that the asserted
interest of one who is injured in fact must be "arguably within the

zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question" has two parts-"to be protected" and "to
be regulated," and the two parts call for separate discussion.
A requirement that the plaintiff's asserted interest be arguably within
the zone of interests "to be protected" by the statute or constitutional
guarantee is analytically faulty in that it ignores the need for continuing
common-law protection of some interests. It would mean, for instance,
that an equity court could no longer decide, on the basis of its conception of what equity requires, that particular nonstatutory and nonconstitutional interests should be entitled to judicial protection.
The freedom of judges to go on determining that new interests emerging from new conditions or new understanding must be preserved.
The whole development of the common law through the centuries has
involved the creation of new "common-law rights." Obviously, that
process should not be terminated. And if judges' power to create new
"rights" must be continued, their smaller power to do something less
than that-to recognize that some new interests suffice for standingmust likewise be continued.
The second part of the test, concerning interests "to be... regulated,"
is even more seriously faulty. A plaihtiff should have standing if he is
in fact regulated to his disadvantage; to have standing he should not
be required to show that the interest he asserts is within the zone of
interests "to be" regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee.
For instance, if a statute authorizes the administrator to regulate
from A to M, and he regulates X without statutory authorization, X
should obviously have standing to challenge, but he does not have under
the Court's test, for he cannot show that he is "to be" regulated.
A recent case38 will help show that the Court's test is faulty. The
Helium Act required government agencies to "purchase all major requirements of helium" from the Secretary of the Interior. 9 Pursuant
to the statute, the Secretary issued regulations requiring contractors
with government agencies to purchase their helium from the Secretary.
38 Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
39 50 U.S.C. § 167d(a) (1964).
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The regulations caused a private producer of helium to lose business,
and it sued for a determination that the regulations were in excess of
the Secretary's authority. The court answered the question of standing
in a single sentence, which seems satisfactory in all respects: "The
Secretary's regulations would interfere with appellees' existing beneficial business relations ... and are subject to challenge by appellees on
the ground that they are invalid .... "40 The court then held the regulations in excess of the Secretary's authority. The holding that the producer had standing seems clearly in line with common sense and with
justice. Yet the producer was neither "to be protected" nor "to be
regulated" by the statute and would therefore be without standing
under the Supreme Court's test.
(2) The test is contrary to much case law the Court could not have
meant to overrule. The basic thrust of the Supreme Court's four recent
decisions is to liberalize the law of standing. But the test the Court proposes would close the judicial doors to many parties to whom the doors
have long been open. The Court could not have intended to overrule all
such cases. Many examples could be given; only a few are here selected.
In the 1902 case of American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 41 the Court accepted as true the School's allegation that it
had engaged in no fraud but that the Postmaster General had issued a
fraud order against it. The statute said nothing directly or indirectly
about interests "to be protected;" it provided neither for procedural
protections nor for judicial review. Of course, it did not provide that
one not engaging in fraud was "to be regulated." The protection the
Court gave the School came from the equity court, not from the statute;
the Court spoke of "irreparable injury" and of the need for equitable
relief. The School's standing was so clear that the Court did not discuss
it. Yet under the Court's test, the interest the School was asserting was
not within the zone of interests "to be protected" or "to be regulated"
by the statute, and therefore the School would lack standing.
A major function of federal courts is to protect private parties from
being "injured in fact" by unlawful action of government officers,
despite the failure of Congress to say directly or indirectly in the statute
or in the legislative history that the interest asserted by the private
party is "to be protected" or "to be regulated." The gradually developed system of using courts to keep officers and agencies within their
powers is mostly the result of judge-made law. "The responsibility of
determining the limits of statutory grants of authority.., is a judicial
function entrusted to the courts by Congress by the statutes establishing
420 F.2d at 594.
41 187 US. 94 (1902).
40
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courts and marking their jurisdiction." 42 Equity steps in as justice requires, and when the remedy is beyond the statute the interests pro48
tected may be.
When an order against a corporation affects the separate interest of
stockholders, as when their equity will 4~e diluted, they have standing
by reason of their separate interest. The cases so holding do not rest
upon any finding that the stockholders are "to be protected" or "to be
regulated" by the statute. 44
When the Postmaster General decided to experiment with sending
first-class mail by air, the railroads asserted lack of statutory authority,
and the court, impressed by the extent of the railroads' investments
in mail carrying, upheld their standing, without anything in the nature
of a finding that they were "to be protected" or "to be regulated" by
the statute."
Federal courts have held in a long line of cases that existing banks
have standing to challenge approval by the Comptroller of the Currency of new banks or of new branches that will compete with existing
banks. If Congress has ever expressed or implied its intent that existing
banks are "to be protected" from new competition, that intent has not
been brought out in the opinions. Only a few of the cases will be mentioned. An early case reasoned that if the competition was unlawful it
was unfair competition, citing the Restatement of Torts.4 Very common is the simple reasoning that if the Comptroller acts illegally, the
plaintiff who is hurt must have standing.47 One court held: "[A] competitor has an obvious interest sufficient to warrant his insistence that
no branch bank be established through procedures or upon grounds
not acceptable under the permissive statutes."4 8 Another formulation:
42 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).
43 For instance, after the Supreme Court had held in Shannahan v. United States, 303
U.S. 596 (1938), that an ICC determination was not reviewable under the Urgent Defidendes Act governing review, the Court later allowed review in an injunction proceeding,
saying that "the nature of the determination points to the propriety of judidal review."
Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 183 (1938).
Another well-known case in which the entire review proceeding was outside the
elaborate statutory scheme is Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
44 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 US. 385 (1945); Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick
& Co., 353 U.S. 151, 169 (1957).
45 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.1L v. Summerfield, 229 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.. 926 (1956).
46 North Arlington Natl Bank v. Kearney Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.2d 564, 565 (3d
Cir. 1951).
47
48

E.g., Marion Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 373, 377 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
First Natl Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1965).
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"[T]he banks surely have the standing to object to illegal competi49
tion."
Cases basing standing upon competitive interests, irrespective of
presence or absence of an indication of legislative intent that competitive interests are "to be proteoted," are very common. A recent example
is Matson Navigation Co. v. FMC,50 holding that a carrier has standing
to challenge the Commission's approval of a merger which would result
in "greater competition." Instead of examining the policy of the Shipping Act, the court simply cited FCC cases, governed by a different
statute.
Persons debarred from contracting with the government were held to
have standing to challenge the debarment order, but the court did not
mention any congressional intent to "protect" or to "regulate" the
debarred persons. The reason the persons debarred had standing was
simply that they were hurt by the order. Judge Burger said for the
court: "The injury to appellants alleged in their complaint gives them
standing to challenge the debarment processes by which such injury
was imposed." 51 If "injury" was enough for Judge Burger, perhaps it
will be enough for Chief Justice Burger.
In writing an opinion that television viewers and listeners have
standing in a renewal proceeding before the FCC, Judge Burger said
nothing about interests "to be protected" or "to be regulated." Instead,
the court reasoned, in part: "Since the concept of standing is a practical
and functional one designed to insure that only those with a genuine
and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding, we can see no
reason to exclude those with such an obvious and acute concern as the
49 Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 388 (8th Cir. 1966).
On a similar problem under a special statute, the court found a legislative intent to
protect the competitive interest. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc.,
399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), collecting a large number of cases on standing of banks to

protect their competitive interests.
5o 405 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968).
51 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The Burger opinions in the Gonzalez and Church of Christ cases seem excellent, and
therefore the deficiencies in his 1969 opinion in National Ass'n of Securities Dealers v.

SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir.), seem surprising. He wrote seven intensive pages on standing,
seemingly maximizing complexities, and concluded: "My position therefore is one of
reservation amounting to virtual disbelief in any standing in Appellees." Then, emphasizing that the questions were "of large public interest" and that no one else would be likely
to challenge, he said that "in the uncertain state of the law as to standing, there is
something to be said on both sides of that question. I therefore resolve my doubts in favor

of the Appellees...
Are principles of equality consistent with the idea that one who raises important questions may have access to the processes of justice but that one who raises unimportant
questions may be denied such access?
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listening audience." 52 The Supreme Court surely could not have intended to supersede the decision of the court of appeals that "we hold
that some 'audience participation' must be allowed in license renewal
53
proceedings."
In a more recent Burger opinion, the court held that the second
highest bidder for a government contract may challenge the validity of
the highest bid. The court approved an injunction against acceptance
of the highest bid, without even referring to the question of standing. 4
Of the numerous recent opinions on standing, one of the most
penetrating and helpful is a 1970 opinion of Judge Tamm for a unanimous court in Scanwell Laboratoriesv. Thomas.55 The plaintiff, who
submitted the second lowest bid for instrument landing systems at airports, was held to have standing to challenge the Federal Aviation Administration's acceptance of the lowest bid on the ground that it was
"non-responsive" within the meaning of the applicable regulation.
The court did not inquire whether the interest was "to be protected"
or "to be regulated." The approach was quite different-and better'
The court reasoned, in part: "If there is arbitrary or capricious action
on the part of any contracting official, who is going to complain about
it, if not the party denied a contract as a result of the alleged illegal
activity? It seems to us that it will be a very healthy check on governmental action to allow such suits ... ."56 A most important part of the
court's opinion is its conclusion, discussed below, that Congress
"clearly" intended in the Administrative Procedure Act to confer standing upon "a party who is in fact aggrieved."
(3) The test is cumbersome,inconvenient, and artificial.The question
of who has standing is a highly practical one that calls for quick and clear
answers. The proposed requirement that the asserted interest must
be within the zone of interests "to be protected or regulated" by the
statute or constitutional guarantee usually leads into legislative history
that cannot be easily consulted and the legislative history usually raises
imponderable questions that cannot be answered with confidence until
some voice of authority has spoken.
When Congress in 1895 enacted a brief statute authorizing the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against those using the mails
to defraud, it was so unconcerned about those not using the mails to
defraud that it said nothing about them in the statute, and it said
52 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
55 Id. at 1005.
r4 Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
55 - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).

56 Id. at

-.
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nothing about either procedural safeguards or judicial review. Was
one not using the mails to defraud "to be protected" by the statute?
One can wonder about this question after studying the statute. One
can search the legislative history and come up with nothing-and go
on wondering. Is not the inquiry artificial and unnecessary at all events?
Even if Congress failed to indicate any intent concerning protection of
one who was not using the mails to defraud, should not the court
remain free to decide that such protection is needed and should be
given? And is not the question whether protection should be given
usually both a more sensible question and an easier one to answer?
Why not say that the equity court remains free-as equity courts
always have been free-to provide such protection as the court deems
fitting, in absence of an affirmative showing that Congress intended that
such protection should be denied?
Every case discussed in the preceding section upheld standing, in each
instance without a showing that the plaintiff's interest was within the
zone of interests "to be protected or regulated" by the statute or constitutional guarantee. Could that showing be made in any of the cases?
What would be required in each instance would be searching of legislative history and then some guessing about imponderables. For instance,
in Gonzalez v. Freeman,57 the court held that those who wanted to
contract with the government had standing to challenge an order debarring them, but it cited no statute. What are the statutes that might
be relevant? Does the legislative history of all such statutes have to be
searched? How long would that require for a skilful worker? What if
the search shows that no one in Congress happened to think of the
possibility of a debarment order, and what if no meaningful expression
of congressional "concern" for the "welfare" of contractors happens
to be found-must an unjust debarment order then be allowed to
stand?
In the helium case the private producer was held to have standing
because the Secretary's illegal action harmed "beneficial business relations."58 If the Supreme Court's test had been used, standing would
depend on whether the producer's interest was within the zone of
interests "to 'be protected" by the statute. But the Helium Act on its
face says nothing about protecting private producers against loss of
business caused by unauthorized action of the Secretary, and the
standing question under the test depends on what happens to have
been said about protecting producers. One who turns to the Senate
report finds nothing about protecting producers from loss of business.
57 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
58 Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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The closest approach to an answer is a statement that the primary
purpose was to assure a sustained supply of helium "to meet essential
Government needs." 59 Since the purpose goes to "Government needs,"
not private needs, perhaps private producers are not "to be protected."
Or will protecting private producers contribute to "a sustained supply"?
These questions can be answered either way. After all the work of
consulting the legislative history, one comes up with seemingly silly
questions that are seemingly unanswerable. Even if some remark had
been made by the Senate Committee which, in the -Court's Barlow
language, expressed "concern" for the "welfare" of helium producers,
would that not be a fortuitous basis on which to decide the standing
question?
The awkwardness of the Court's test can be brought out by applying
the test to pre-1968 cases in which courts have denied standing-and
the exercise could possibly be profitable by incidentally shedding light
on the new law of standing. Courts have held in a series of cases that
an electric utility lacks standing to challenge a Rural Electrification
Administration loan to a cooperative even though the new competition
is economically harmful to the utility.60 Are the cases still law? The
general basis for the holdings was that the utility had "no legal right"
under the Tennessee Electric Power test, which is rejected by Data
Processing and Barlow. The crucial question is whether the utility's
interest is "to be protected" under the Rural Electrification Act. The
Act on its face is silent.6 1 So one who wants an answer must run down
the legislative history. During debate, Senator McNary remarked:
"[U]nder the language used, it seems to me, where a plant is now in
existence which is adequately supplying a certain area with electricity
none of the money provided by the bill could be used for that purpose,"
and Senator Norris, manager of the bill, responded, "That is as I
understand it."62 Representative Rayburn, manager of the bill in the
House, said: "[W]e are not, in this bill, intending to go out and compete with anybody. By this bill, we hope to bring electrification to
people who do not now have it. This bill was not written on the theory
that we were going to punish somebody or parallel their lines or enter
into competition with them.1 63 Representative Fletcher said: "[T]here
& AD. NEws 3595.
60 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 884 (1955); REA v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
59 1960 U.S. CODE CONG.

815 (1966); REA v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 945 (1967); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Cooperative, 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968).
61 7 U.S.C. § 901 (1964).
62 80 CONG. REc. 2751 (1936).
63 Id. at 5283.
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is no intention that the Rural Electrification Administration will sponsor competition with private enterprise ... [T]his program does not
64
contemplate nor permit competition with existing public utilities."
Are these statements enough to show that the interests of the existing
utilities are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ...
by the statute.. ."? The answer could be yes if enough emphasis is put
on the word "arguably."
But the Senate Report quoted the REA Administrator: "The policy
of the utility companies has been to skim off the cream of the business.
Such a policy has precluded the extension of service to nearly 90 percent of American farms ... we have insisted upon the inclusion of all
territory which can be covered in a self-liquidating project." 65 Does
this "arguably" pull in the opposite direction?
On the basis of the Court's test and of this legislative history, can any
lawyer, either for an agency or for a private party, answer with assurance
the question whether the utility has standing? And even if the remarks
of the legislators were more favorable to the utility-or less favorable
to it-should standing or lack of it depend upon the fortuities of who
said what, without having the question of standing in mind?
Aside from the awkwardness and inconvenience of applying the
Court's test, is not the question of who should have access to a court's
processes more likely to be answered satisfactorily if a court is free
to decide on the basis of what it deems to be the needs of justice?
(4) The test is contrary to the congressional intent in the Administrative ProcedureAct. Neither the Supreme Court nor any other court
has ever written an opinion which makes a full-scale inquiry into the
legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act's provision on
standing. Instead, what has happened in the main is that the leading
McKay case,6 6 now partially discredited,(7 announced some conclusions
on the basis of a superficial consideration, and other courts have largely
followed that leadership.
The Supreme Court should examine the legislative history of the
APA. When it does, it is likely to agree with the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, which in a carefully considered 1970 opinion
concluded that "in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has not
yet chosen to hold that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to
all situations in which a party who is in fact aggrieved seeks review,
at 5307.
65 S. REP. No. 1581, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
66 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
64 Id.

U.S. 884 (1955).
67

See text at notes 9 & 10 supra.
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regardless of a lack of legal right or specific statutory language, it is
clearly the intent of that Act that this should be the case." 68
The Supreme Court in Data Processing and Barlow violated what
the District of Columbia Circuit said was "dearly' the intent" without
even discussing the legislative history. Surely a full inquiry into the
legislative history is in order.
The Act as codified provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." 69
For standing, one need not suffer "legal wrong." That is the same as
saying that one need not have a "legal right." One who lacks a legal
right but who is "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute" has standing. But do the
words "within the meaning of a relevant statute" modify only the words
"aggrieved by agency action" or do they also modify the words "adversely affected"? This question cannot be answered with confidence
on the basis of examining the statutory words, for the phraseology is
ambiguous. But the legislative history does answer the question.
Both the Senate Committee and the House Committee said: "This
subsection confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected
in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute."7o
The statement by the Committee differs in two respects from the
statutory provision: (1) It adds the words "in fact" after "adversely affected." (2) It puts the words "by agency action" after "affected in
fact" and thereby tends to show that the words "within the meaning
of any statute" do not modify "adversely affected in fact." The two
differences pull in the same direction; both pull toward the conclusion
that the Committees intended to confer the right of review upon "any
person adversely affected in fact by agency action."
The statement by the Committees seems to mean that "any person
affected in fact by agency action" is entitled to review, and that "any
person . . .aggrieved within the meaning of any statute" is entitled
to review.
One would have to strain the words of the Committees to interpret
68 Scanwell Laboratories v. Thomas, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
69 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1967). The uncodified version did not differ in substance:
"Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to
judidal review thereof." 5 US.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
70 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946).
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them to mean that "any person adversely affected in fact by agency
action ... within the meaning of any statute" is entitled to review,
and that "any person... aggrieved within the meaning of any statute"
is entitled to review. For two reasons, finding that meaning in the
Committees' words would strain those words: The words "in fact"
after "adversely affected" seem to be inconsistent with the idea that
the words "within the meaning of any statute" modify "adversely affected." And putting the words "by agency action" after "adversely
affected" instead of putting them after "adversely affected or aggrieved"
pulls away from an interpretation that the words "within the meaning
of any statute" modify "adversely affected."
If the Committees had intended the words "within the meaning of
any statute" to modify not only "aggrieved" but also "adversely affected," they could easily have left out the words "in fact" and they could
have transposed the sentence to read: "This subsection confers a right
of review upon any person who, within the meaning of any statute, is
adversely affected or aggrieved." But the Committees did not say that.
Instead, they conferred the right of review upon "any person adversely
affected in fact by agency action" and upon "any person.., aggrieved
within the meaning of any statute." This is the only meaning of the
Committees' statement that does not strain its words.
The Committees would have no occasion to say "adversely affected
in fact . . . within the meaning of any statute" unless some statute
other than the Administrative Procedure Act provides for review at
the instance of one "adversely affected in fact." But no such statute
has come to the attention of this writer, and the probability seems
strong that the Committees knew of no such statute. One who is
"adversely affected" is entitled to review under the Communications
Act, 71 as well as under other statutes. One who is "aggrieved" is entitled
to review under the Securities Act, 72 as well as under other statutes.
But no statute has been found which says that a person "adversely
affected in fact" is entitled to review. The Committees mentioned no
such statute. Therefore, they probably did not mean that one "adversely
affected in fact .
within the meaning of any statute" is entitled to
review. If they did not mean that, they must have meant what their
literal words seem to say-that "any person adversely affected in fact
by agency action" is entitled to review, and that "any person . . .
aggrieved within the meaning of any statute" is entitled to review.
Other relevant legislative history, summarized elsewhere, "clutters
71 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964).
72 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (1964).
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up the question more than it detracts from the committee's statements."73
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its 1970
opinion seems to have strong support in the legislative history for its
conclusion that "it is dearly the intent" of Congress in the APA that "a
party who is in fact aggrieved" has standing.7 4 A reasonable argument
could be made that the word "clearly" is unjustified. But clear intent
need not be found. Intent is enough.
IV.

SOME FUNDAMENTALS ABOUT STANDING

The natural system is that of the common law: If A and B are
private parties and A hurts B, B has standing to get a determination
of the legality of A's action. Why should not the law be the same,
whether A is the government, and agency, an officer, or a private
party, and whether the injury is to B's person, his physical property,
or his intangible interests? Is not the natural system the simple one
that injury in fact is enough for standing?
The only problems about standing should be what interests deserve
protection against injury, and what should be enough to constitute
an injury. Whether interests deserve legal protection depends upon
whether they are sufficiently significant and whether good policy calls
for protecting them or for denying them protection. The common law
usually provides remedies for slight injuries to small interests-the
touching of the person, a single footstep on one's land, the slightest
dent of a fender. But the common law for policy reasons refuses to
protect the criminal's interest in less police alertness, the defrauder's
interest in easy access to gullible victims, or even the ordinary business
man's interest in avoiding effective competition.
By and large, the state courts follow the common law attitudes in
governing judicial review of administrative action, so that the judicial doors are widely open to anyone who asserts a legitimate interest;
one who is hurt in fact has standing unless a statute or a "public
policy" requires otherwise. The resulting law of standing is both
simple and satisfactory. So is the state law that goes further and even
allows any "citizen" or "resident" to raise questions about proper
behavior of public officials. Opening the doors so widely does not
mean that the courts are overrun with cases that ought not to be
decided. It does mean that litigation about the law of standing is
rather slight.
73 3 K.C. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.02 (1958).

74 Scanwell Laboratories v. Thomas, -

F.2d -

(D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Why, then, have the federal courts turned the law of standing
into a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction" 75 that keeps on
producing a large volume of wasteful litigation that in turn keeps
on adding to the complexity? The federal courts followed the natural
system during the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth. The 1911 case of Muskrat v. United States76 may have initiated
an attitude that has deepened. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's basic thinking,
expressed in 1924 in A Note on Advisory Opinions,77 was quite influential, preparing the way for the 1939 extreme pronouncement in
Tennessee Electric Power that nothing short of infringement of a
"legal right" would suffice for standing.78 The retention of that attitude
has probably been motivated by various ideas not appearing on the
face of formal opinions, such as the notion that the law of standing
can keep judges from assuming too much governmental power, that
it can limit courts to appropriate subject matter, that it can help
assure competent presentation of cases, and, above all, that it can
protect against a flood of litigation that might so much overburden
the courts as to produce a disastrous deterioration in the quality of
all that courts do.
Perhaps the time is approaching when the Supreme Court will
correct these many misconceptions. The law of standing is the wrong
tool to accomplish judicial objectives unrelated to the task of deciding whether a particular interest asserted is deserving of judicial
protection. The courts should avoid hypothetical or remote questions-through the law of ripeness, not through the law of standing.
The courts should decline to enter political areas-through the law
of political questions, not through the law of standing. The courts
should limit themselves to issues "appropriate for judicial determination"-through the law of case or controversy, but not through that
part of the law of case or controversy pertaining to standing. The
courts should avoid taking over functions of government that are
committed to executives or administrators-through the law of scope
of review, not through the law of standing. The courts should virtually stay away from some governmental activities, such as foreign
affairs and military operations-through the law of unreviewability,
not through the law of standing. The courts should insist upon competent presentation of cases-through refusals to respond to inadequate
presentations, not through the law of standing.
75 United States ex tel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
76 219 US. 346 (1911).
77 37 H..Rv. L REV. 1002 (1924).
78 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-8 (1939).
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In recent years the unfortunate idea has blossomed in judicial
opinions that the law of standing can be used to assure the competent
presentation of cases. The Court in Baker v. Carr spoke of "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues .... ,9
The Court furthered that idea in Flast, saying that if the required
"nexus" exists between the plaintiff's status and his claim of standing,
"we feel . . . that the questions will be framed with the necessary
specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor
to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form
traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution." 80 The same
idea cropped up in the Data Processing and Barlow opinions. 81 The
idea deserves a quiet burial. Standing should not depend upon the
probable manner in which a party will present a case; it should depend
only upon the question whether the plaintiff should be entitled to
judicial assistance in order that justice may be done. Two simple
illustrations, one at each pole, should suffice to show this: (1) The best
law firm in the country, no matter how skilful its presentation to
the court may be, obviously lacks standing to get an adjudication of
an abstract question of law when neither it nor its client has any
interest at stake. (2) An illiterate pauper who refuses legal assistance
obviously has standing to challenge a $10 fine imposed on him, no
matter how badly he may present his case. Some interests the Supreme
Court has properly held sufficient for standing include a fraction of
a vote, a $1.50 poll tax, and a fine of five dollars and costs. The law
of standing cannot assure that questions will be framed with "specificity," that cases will be contested with "adverseness," or that litigation will be pursued with "vigor."
A social science research project could probably answer the question
whether the waste involved in voluminous litigation about the complexities of the law of standing is greater than the waste that would
result even from an extreme system of allowing standing to anyone who
wants to be a plaintiff. In absence of a scientific answer, the courts must
make a judgment. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has recently done so, and it has come up with the convincing statement
that when state courts have relaxed the requirements for standing
"the dockets... have not increased appreciably as a result of new cases
79 369 US. 186, 204 (1962).
80 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
81 90 S. Ct. at 836; 90 S. Ct. at 841.

1970]

Standing

in which standing would previously have been denied."8 2 The Second
Circuit had previously made a similar observation.8 3 Furthermore,
experience of the federal courts themselves shows that floods of litigation do not result when the judicial doors are opened to all. A 1953
case 4 held that a "consumer"-anyone who eats-has standing to challenge action of the Food and Drug Administration; if consumers have
brought many cases, they must all be unreported. Many statutes, including the Food and Drug Act and the Communications Act, have long
provided specifically for standing of "any person adversely affected"
but litigation under those statutes seems to be no more voluminous than
litigation under other statutes. Half or more of the specific statutes are
as broad-"any person aggrieved, .... any person disclosing a substantial
interest," "any party in interest," but the litigation is in trickles, not
floods.
Even without a social science research project, the courts should easily
arrive at the conclusion that opening the doors to anyone "injured in
fact" will not appreciably increase the number of parties who seek to
litigate. It will cause an enormous drop in the huge volume of litigation
in the federal courts about the complexities of the law of standing.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Supreme Court in two 1968 opinions and in two 1970 opinions
has drastically liberalized the law of standing, moving at least threequarters of the distance from the pre-1968 law to the position that
"injury in fact" should be the sole test. In rejecting the old test, focused
largely on "legal interest," the Court has been unanimous. The accomplishment is of great consequence; many plaintiffs now have standing who would have been denied standing before 1968.
The live issue now is whether the Court should travel the remaining
one-quarter of the distance to the sole test of "injury in fact." Justices
Brennan and White have written a strong opinion saying it should.
Six Justices have held back, attempting in the Data Processingopinion
to create a second test that must be satisfied for standing-"whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or conScanwell Laboratories v. Thomas, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
83 "We see no justification for the Commission's fear that our determination [granting
standing] will encourage 'literally thousands' to intervene and seek review in future proceedings. We rejected a similar contention in Associated Industries . . . noting that 'no
such horrendous possibilities' exist." Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 854
F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
84 Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
82
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stitutional guarantee in question." The Court stumbled in applying
that second test in Barlow, for it decided whether the interests of the
farmers in general were arguably within the zone, not whether "the
interest sought to be protected" was. That failure went to the essence
of the Court's holding, but it probably could not have been intended
by the Court. The live issue is whether the second test as stated in Data
Processing-notas applied in Barlow-should be added to the test of
"injury in fact."
The reasons for rejecting the second test are powerful ones. The
"to be protected" part of the test is analytically faulty in that an equity
court would be deprived of its accustomed power to decide, on the basis
of its conception of what equity requires, whether or not to provide
judicial protection to nonstatutory and nonconstitutional interests. The
"to be regulated" part is even more seriously faulty in that a person who
is not "to be" regulated under the statute would lack standing to challenge an agency's unlawful regulation of him. The test would deny
standing to many persons who have had standing under pre-1968 law,
and the Court could not intend that, because its basic purpose is to
liberalize the law of standing, not to restrict it. The test is needlessly
cumbersome and inconvenient to judges and to practitioners, requiring
search of legislative history and guesses about imponderables. The test
adds to the complexity of the law of standing, and it adds to the uncertainty of what the law is on many particular problems. The test is
contrary to the intent behind the Administrative Procedure Act; if the
Supreme Court will for the first time make a careful examination of
the APA's legislative history, it is likely to agree with a 1970 opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that "it is dearly
the intent of that Act" that "a party who is in fact aggrieved" should
have standing, although the Supreme Court might omit the word
"clearly."
The main test should be "injury in fact," as Justices Brennan and
White assert, but the Court's second test can be altered to make it a
useful tool, mainly by shifting the burden to the other side: A person
whose legitimate interest is injured in fact should have standing unless
congressional intent is discernible that the interest he asserts is not to
be protected. This will mean judicial enforcement of whatever legislative intent is discernible, and also that in the many cases in which
the statute and the legislative history show no intent either to protect
the particular interest or not to protect it, injury in fact will be the sole
test. Of course, no court will protect an interest that runs counter to
public policy, such as the interest of a criminal in avoiding detection.
The presumption of reviewability should be broadened so that it will
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apply not only to subject matter but also to parties. The Supreme
Court's remark in Abbott Laboratories,made in a context of reviewability, should be extended to apply to problems of standing: "[J]udicial
review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut
off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress."8 5
The concept of "injury in fact" need not be pushed to its outer limits.
The guide in marking out its limits should be whatever legislative
intent is discernible, and in absence of such intent the guide should be
a judicial judgment as to whether the interest asserted is in the circumstances deserving of judicial protection. A holding that a person is not
"injured in fact" when the government confers a benefit on his competitor would be reasonable. The concept of "injury in fact" need not
be rigid either as to what it includes or what it excludes. It can be kept
both flexible and simple.
The nucleus of the law to guide applications of the test should be
not only the Brennan-White opinion but also the opinions of Judge
Burger (now Chief Justice) in Gonzalez88 and Church of Christ,8 7 the
opinion of Judge Leventhal in the helium case,88 and the opinion of
89
Judge Tamm in Scanwell Laboratories.
Complexities about standing are barriers to justice; in removing the
barriers the emphasis should be on the needs of justice. One whose
legitimate interest is in fact injured by illegal action of an agency or
officer should have standing because justice requires that such a party
should have a chance to show that the action that hurts his interest is
illegal.
The law of standing can be simple. Judge Leventhal's one-sentence
opinion that a helium producer had standing to challenge regulations
that caused a loss of customers seems entirely satisfactory: "The Secretary's regulations would interfere with appellees' existing beneficial
business relations.. . and are subject to challenge by appellees .... "Do
Such simplicity, with "injury in fact" as the main focus, has much
to commend it.
85 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).

86 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
87 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
88 Air Reduction Co. v. ickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
89.Scanwell Laboratories v. Thomas, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).

90 Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

